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Abstract
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has
emphasized the importance of international SOF collaboration, or what
USSOCOM refers to as a “global SOF network.” It is difficult to achieve
requisite levels of collaboration even among departments and agencies
within a single country, much less on an international basis. Yet
USSOCOM has been rightly praised for its trailblazing collaboration
efforts in counterterrorism operations, so perhaps it can extend
successful collaboration to its “global SOF network.” This article argues
collaboration lessons from the past decade of counterterrorism
operations can be used to facilitate better international SOF
collaboration. Even if the lessons are well recognized they will be hard to
act upon, especially when USSOCOM is using its indirect approach to
SOF missions managed out of U.S. embassies overseas. But the first step
in solving any problem is recognizing the nature of the problem and what
is required to solve it. The rest is all disciplined, aggressive and
intelligent implementation, which Special Operations Forces do well.
Erratum
P. 10: Figure 1 in the published version shows an adapted diagram from
the US Army Field Manual (3-60) with notations inserted in red to reflect
the notations made on a hand drawn diagram that appeared on p. 153 of
Stanley A. McChrystal's book, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (Portfolio/
Penguin, 2013). The author originally inserted in the manuscript a
captured image of the diagram that appeared on p. 153 of Gen.
McChrystal's book. The notations were McChrystal's, not those of author
(Christopher Lamb), and their representation in the published diagram
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Introduction 
Historically, special operations forces (SOF) have been the preferred military 
units for irregular threats like terrorism and insurgency.  Such threats are 
increasingly transnational, threatening the welfare of multiple countries if not the 
international community as a whole.  Accordingly, over the past few years the 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has emphasized the 
importance of international SOF collaboration, or what USSOCOM refers to as a 
“global SOF network,” particularly for counterterrorism but other irregular 
threats as well.1  
 
The value of counterterrorism collaboration across national boundaries is well 
recognized, as is the difficulty of international cooperation in areas as sensitive as 
special operations.  While nations share a common goal in combating terrorism, 
their agendas frequently diverge and reconciling those competing objectives is 
challenging.  Indeed, it is difficult to achieve the high levels of collaboration 
among national security organizations required for effective counterterrorism 
operations within a single country.  Extending the level of required collaboration 
to multiple national SOF forces is even more difficult.  USSOCOM has been 
praised for its trailblazing efforts in interagency collaboration in 
counterterrorism operations, and now it is equally determined to extend and 
strengthen its “global SOF network.”  The argument made in this article is that 
lessons about collaborating across organizational boundaries from the past 
decade of counterterrorism operations can be used to facilitate better 
international SOF collaboration through USSOCOM’s global SOF network. 
 
Interagency Collaboration in SOF Counterterrorism Operations 
USSOCOM is now widely recognized for achieving unprecedented levels of 
interagency collaboration in support of its counterterrorism efforts since 
September 11, 2001.2  Prior to 2001, SOF counterterrorism operations often were 
hobbled by lack of “actionable” intelligence; i.e., intelligence considered reliable, 
comprehensive, detailed, and timely enough to justify the risks associated with 
launching SOF to attack terrorists.  Following the September 11, 2001 terror 
attacks, the tolerance for risk skyrocketed, but SOF also had to solve the 
actionable intelligence problem.  The SOF units with lead counterterrorism 
responsibilities, often referred to as special mission units by USSOCOM leaders, 
reasoned they had to build interagency teams in Washington, D.C. and in the 
field to tap, analyze, and exploit all the U.S. intelligence sources available for 
immediate support of SOF counterterrorism operations.  They succeeded and in 
the process took counterterrorism operations to an unprecedented level of 
efficacy.   
 
These combined teams of interagency analysts and SOF operators conducted 
network-based targeting.  They used all-source intelligence, including intelligence 
                                                        
1 McRaven, William H.  Admiral, "Panel Discussion," National Defense Industrial Association 
(NDIA) Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Symposium, Washington, D.C., 
February 10-12, 2014. 
2 Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion draws upon Christopher Lamb and Evan 
Munsing, “Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation,” Strategic 
Perspectives, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, March 2011. 
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gathered during their own operations, to chart terrorist organizations and build 
target portfolios on key terrorists that the SOF teams could act upon 
immediately.  They had to balance the risk of revealing information sources with 
the need to move quickly before their targets or their associates could be warned, 
which was difficult.  However, co-locating representatives from all the U.S. 
intelligence agencies with SOF operators on a sustained basis greatly improved 
information sharing and thus enabled persistent surveillance of adversaries.  The 
interagency teams eliminated the organizational seams that can delay intelligence 
sharing and inhibit momentum.   
 
Too often counterterrorism operations operated on the basis of stale intelligence 
and slow approval processes.  Before SOF could launch an attack, the target had 
moved on and escaped.  Interagency field teams with good connectivity to parent 
organizations and their unique sources of information provided an “unblinking 
eye” for persistent tracking of high-value targets.  They also allowed U.S. forces to 
make better decisions about what targets to take down and when.  Over time, the 
special mission units’ counterterrorist operations were better coordinated with 
other U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency operations, although tensions 
between the two types of forces and missions remained a problem. 
 
As SOF gained an understanding of the requirements for successful interagency 
operations, it expanded the use of interagency teams in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
elsewhere.  SOF leaders also built interagency teams at higher levels of the 
national security system to support interagency coordination and 
counterterrorist campaign planning.  Most of these organizational constructs are 
referred to as Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF).  USSOCOM has become a 
major proponent and user of JIATFs, interagency education, and best practices.  
Among the many lessons from USSOCOM-sponsored interagency operations four 
are especially noteworthy.   
 
Lessons from Joint Interagency Task Forces 
A few years ago little was known about SOF interagency teams, but there is an 
increasing body of literature now devoted to the topic, including General Stanley 
McChrystal’s memoirs.  Excerpts from McChrystal’s memoirs demonstrate four 
key requirements for successful interagency organizations.  The prerequisites for 
success can also be illustrated with examples from JIATF South, the highly 
successful U.S. counternarcotics organization that pioneered effective joint 
interagency operations.3  It is easier to illustrate principles for effective 
interagency operations using examples from JIATF South because 
counternarcotics operations are not as highly classified as special operations.4  
SOF-managed JIATFs and JIATF South share many common elements, and not 
entirely coincidentally.  USSOCOM was one of many U.S. national security 
organizations following the terror attacks on 9/11 that sent its leaders to visit and 
learn from JIATF South.   
                                                        
3 Some sources date the first JIATF to 1989, but they may be confusing JIATFs with Joint Task 
Forces.  JIATF South was evolved from a Joint Task Force but did not become a JIATF until 1994 
when the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy distributed the first National 
Interdiction Command and Control Plan, which created JIATFs.   
4 The discussion of JIATF South is based on Evan Munsing and Christopher Jon Lamb, “Joint 
Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success,” Strategic 
Perspectives 5, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2011. 
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Collaboration is the ‘Key’ to Success  
McChrystal dubbed the approach used by SOF special mission units 
“collaborative warfare,”5 and the term was applicable.  Interagency collaboration 
was the key ingredient for success.  McChrystal saw the U.S. counterterrorism 
effort suffering for lack of interagency collaboration:  “Early on, 
counterproductive infighting among the CIA, State Department, Department of 
Defense, and others back in Washington threatened [the] campaign [against al-
Qaida].”  The relationship between the CIA and Department of Defense was 
particularly frustrating:  “At best we were fighting parallel, fractured campaigns 
against al-Qaeda; ours had to be a unified fight.”6  
 
McChrystal accepted McRaven’s recommendation for “a true joint interagency 
task force” and experimented with various versions of it.  The interagency task 
forces had to solve the fundamental problem of providing actionable intelligence 
to SOF counterterrorism units as depicted in the “F3EA” diagram below.  The 
main effort was exploiting intelligence from operations and analyzing it rapidly, 
which could only be done with real-time, ongoing interagency collaboration in 
direct proximity to SOF units.  Interagency collaboration was not just 
“important” but “central to our effectiveness.”  As McChrystal notes, “finishing” 
the enemy had been SOF’s “traditional strength,” but exploiting and analyzing 
intelligence now became SOF’s “main effort.”7 
 
Figure 1: Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate (F3EAD)8 
 
                                                        
5 Bob Woodward, “Why Did the Violence Plummet? It Wasn’t Just the Surge,” The Washington 
Post, September 8, 2008. 
6 McChrystal, Stanley A., My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2013), 
118.   
7 Ibid, 131, 153. 
8 U.S.  Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-60: The Targeting Process (Washington, D.C.: 
HQDA, November 26, 2010): B-2. 
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Often organizations pursuing missions that require interagency collaboration fail 
precisely because they consider interagency collaboration merely an advantage 
rather than an essential prerequisite for success.  JIATF South receives more 
than 8,000 visitors a year who marvel at the level of interagency collaboration 
undergirding its counternarcotic operations.  Unfortunately, the vast majority 
leave amazed but not enlightened.  JIATF South representatives explained to the 
author that visitors who appear genuinely anxious to emulate its success 
nonetheless are prone to return to their parent organizations and fail to make the 
interagency the centerpiece of their operational focus.  Thankfully, USSOCOM 
leaders did not make this mistake.  McChrystal made sure his entire organization 
understood that “collaborative warfare” would be the order of the day. 
 
Sponsoring Organizations Must Change First to Enable Collaboration 
It has been argued that what distinguishes leadership from management is the 
ability to change an organization’s culture.9  McChrystal seemed to understand 
this.  He realized that the great benefits from interagency teams “would also 
require changes equally significant …physical, organizational, procedural, and—
most important—cultural” in his own organization.10  McChrystal had to make his 
SOF units “more accommodating to those agencies we were courting.”11  To 
create trust between all the interagency partners he needed to support his field 
teams McChrystal had to first change his own organization, which was difficult.   
 
McChrystal’s initiatives went against strongly held cultural norms in the SOF 
units he was leading.  Yet he did not believe there was any alternative: “We were 
convinced the secretive and compartmentalized traditions of special operations 
forces, particularly [special mission units], would doom us.”  Ultimately he and 
other SOF leaders were persuasive and the special mission units “deliberately 
craft[ed] our work spaces to channel interaction, force collaboration and ease the 
flow of people and information.”12  They bent classification rules and “shared 
information until it hurt” in order to establish trust, which remained a fragile and 
perishable commodity on the teams: 
 
“We instructed our people to share more information than they were 
comfortable with and to do so with anyone who wanted to be part of our 
network.  We allowed other agencies to follow our operations (previously 
unheard of), and we widely distributed, without preconditions, 
intelligence we captured or analysis we’d conducted.  The actual 
information shared was important, but more valuable was the trust built 
up through voluntarily sharing it with others.”13  
 
In addition to information sharing and partnering, McChrystal shared his 
organization’s resources with others.  He also allocated large numbers of his 
                                                        
9 I am indebted to Jim Kurtz of the Institute for Defense Analyses for this observation, who found 
the assertion in Scroggs, Stephen K., Army Relations with Congress: Thick Armor, Dull Sword, 
Slow Horse (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), which cited Edgar H.  Schein, Organizational Culture 
and Leadership.  2nd ed.  (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 12. 
10 McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir, 154. 
11 Ibid, 149. 
12 Ibid, 150-51. 
13 Ibid, 154-55. 
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scarce and highly-trained personnel to liaison duties.  All of these practices were 
counter-cultural for SOF special mission units, but essential for building trust 
and removing impediments to collaboration. 
 
Earlier, JIATF South had come to the same realization: It would have to change 
itself before it could secure cooperation from other parties.  When JIATF South 
was still a Joint Task Force led by the Department of Defense it gave priority to 
Department of Defense perspectives.  The Department of Defense grudgingly 
accepted the counter narcotics mission, and wanted to limit its involvement after 
doing its part to detect drug trafficking.  Department of Defense personnel were 
prone to heavily classify their intelligence rather than share it with interagency 
partners.  Moreover, intelligence fusion and drug interdiction were largely kept 
separate, so there was none of the meshing of intelligence and operations that 
later become the hallmark of JIATF South.  Gradually this all changed as 
authorities, assets, and intelligence programs were consolidated and the Joint 
Task Force became a Joint Interagency Task Force that transformed itself into a 
genuine interagency construct.  The culmination was a broadening of the 
organization’s conceptualization of the counternarcotics mission into a holistic, 
“end-to-end” construct from intelligence cueing in host countries to prosecution 
of narcotics traffickers in the United States. 
 
An ‘End-to-End’ Mission Approach is Necessary 
All the elements of the F3EA chain of operational activities ultimately became 
interagency efforts.  Each element of the chain is a complex and difficult task.  
Historically, SOF special mission units focus on the “finish” portion of the cycle; 
i.e., the movement to target, take-down, and exfiltration from the site.  After 
years of operations against al-Qaida, however, SOF leaders realized they needed 
to take responsibility for the full F3EA cycle (which with the addition of 
disseminate later become F3EAD).  They built teams that managed the entire 
cycle holistically and became operational juggernauts capable of rounding up 
numerous targets on a nightly basis.  One knowledgeable British observer claims 
that the “templated industrial manner” U.S. special mission units used “set a pace 
of operations that probably removed from the streets most of the members of al-
Qaeda in Iraq [AQI].”14  Initially focused on eliminating key terrorist leaders, SOF 
special mission units began to aspire to wholesale attrition of the terrorist 
organizations:  
 
“If we could apply relentless body blows against AQI [it] would be 
consumed with staying alive and thus have no ability to recruit, raise 
funds, or strategize.  Instead of trying solely to decapitate the top echelon 
of leaders, we would disembowel the organization by targeting its 
midlevel commanders…we believed we could get the organization to 
collapse in on itself.”15 
                                                        
14 Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the SAS and the Secret War in Iraq 
(London: Little, Brown, 2010), 266, 271. 
15 McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir, 161-62; McChrystal seems conflicted over how 
much attrition of terrorist organizational structure should be valued.  On the same pages he notes, 
“I had already concluded that a strict decapitation strategy was unlikely to work.  Top al-Qaeda 
leaders were well hidden, and their capture or death was rarely decisive.  Moreover, a string of 
effective operations could give us a false sense that we could slowly grind Zarqawi’s network out of 
existence.” He argues the important point was to control the tempo and take the fight to lower 
Lamb: Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration
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The high pace of operations led some to hope that al-Qaida in Iraq would collapse 
from attrition.  Others despaired that SOF operations were creating too many 
unintended casualties, too many enemies among otherwise neutral parties, and 
not enough strategic effects.  Eventually, the SOF interagency teams broadened 
their understanding of second and third order effects to include the political and 
social impact of their kill and capture operations.  It was a not a transition easily 
accepted by special mission units, but eventually SOF expanded the F3EA “end-
to-end” conceptualization of the SOF mission to include partnering with 
conventional forces on counterinsurgency.16  The result was greater strategic 
impact, and SOF operations were able to help reverse the deteriorating situation 
in Iraq in 2007. 
 
In this regard, SOF followed the pattern that transformed JIATF South.  JIATF 
South leaders could have continued to limit Department of Defense participation 
in the counternarcotics mission, a stance that would have been popular with their 
superiors.  But eschewing responsibility for developing intelligence sources and 
successfully prosecuting traffickers meant ignoring the activities that were the 
focus of law enforcement agencies JIATF South that was trying to woo.  So, 
JIATF South leaders broadened their “end-to-end” concept for the organization’s 
mission.  The organization began to pay attention to the entire drug movement 
process, from how bulk shipments were paid for and moved, to who benefited 
from the shipments, to how traffickers were arrested, imprisoned, and turned 
into informants, which then produced more intelligence that JIATF South could 
use to improve interdiction and prosecutions.  “This breadth of view made JIATF 
East a natural ally for every agency involved in counterdrug operations,” and 
finally “demonstrated that the whole-of-government approach to counter 
narcotics [could be] dramatically greater than the sum of its parts.”17 
 
Delegating Responsibility for Local Best Practices 
The previous three prerequisites for success had to be led and supported by 
senior leaders.  However, McChrystal understood that while he could set the 
conditions for success, he had to delegate responsibility for carrying out 
interagency operations to keep pace with an adaptive and fast-moving foe: 
 
“Much of my and my command team’s time was spent solidifying the 
partnerships with the half dozen agencies involved in a single cycle of 
F3EA.  I knew the creative solutions …would originate from those closest 
to the fight—closest to the hiccups.  So while most members of [special 
mission units] were self-starters by nature, I needed them to operate 
without waiting for detailed instructions or approvals.  [We] tried to set a 
climate in which we prized entrepreneurship and free thinking, leaned 
hard on complacency, and did not punish ideas that failed.  ‘As long as it 
                                                        
ranks of the terrorist organization.  Later he reports that he could feel al-Qaeda cracking under the 
pressure of SOF’s relentless blows (p. 247), but admits some of that might have been wishful 
thinking. 
16 McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir, 244-46. 
17 Munsing and Lamb, “Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation,” 
30. 
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is not immoral or illegal,’ went my frequent refrain, ‘we’ll do it.  Don’t wait 
for me.  Do it.’ ….we pushed authority down until it made us uneasy.”18 
 
The result was that McChrystal’s general principles were applied to good effect by 
his team leaders in light of local circumstances.  In addition, innovation began to 
well up from lower levels.  McChrystal notes that “rarely did any one thing 
transform our capacity, and few ideas could be traced back to one person.” 
Instead, after long periods of gestation and incremental changes, major 
improvements in performance occurred, which McChrystal documents in his 
memoirs.  When a best practice was developed or stumbled upon, SOF leaders 
were quick to expand its use.  They encouraged learning and made learning assets 
available (McChrystal notes that “How to Be a Liaison Officer” was one of the 
better instructional videos).  Similarly, JIATF South learned to keep pace with its 
well-financed, creative and ruthless foes by delegating authority, quickly 
instituting best practices, developing a training program to get new arrivals up to 
speed quickly, and pushing authority down to the lowest possible levels of the 
organization.  Visitors to JIATF South are often surprised to see relatively junior 
officers directing sensitive operations while more senior officers present watch.   
 
These lessons from SOF interagency collaboration and other JIATF experience 
are useful for informing USSOCOM’s approach to building a global SOF network.  
To make that argument it is first necessary to make a distinction between SOF’s 
direct and indirect approaches.  SOF progress on interagency collaboration has 
been a byproduct of its direct approach to counterterrorism.  SOF leaders believe 
USSOCOM needs to focus more on its indirect approach in the future, something 
the global SOF network is expected to facilitate.  Thus, before examining whether 
lessons from the past decade of interagency collaboration are applicable to SOF’s 
indirect approach, we need to explain the distinction between the direct and 
indirect approaches. 
 
SOF’s Direct and Indirect Approaches 
USSOCOM is now “shift[ing] the focus from counterterrorism operations to more 
indirect activities in the human domain” through its global SOF network.19 
USSOCOM often makes a distinction between direct and indirect SOF 
approaches when making the case for a global SOF network to combat irregular 
threats.  Typically, the direct approach means U.S. SOF engaging a discrete threat 
themselves.  By contrast, the indirect approach usually refers to working with 
partners to “erode the capabilities of terrorist organizations and degrade their 
ability to acquire support and sanctuary.”20  The archetypical examples of the 
direct and indirect approach often cited are, respectively, the mission by U.S. SOF 
to kill Usama bin Laden and the advisory mission U.S. SOF have performed over 
the past decade in support of the Philippine government efforts to counter 
terrorism by Abu Sayyaf.  Sometimes the direct approach is described as 
requiring intense interagency collaboration, while the indirect approach requires 
intense collaboration with foreign partners understanding that some countries 
                                                        
18 McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir, 157. 
19 Col. Stuart W.  Bradin, Chief of the Global SOF Network Operational Planning Team, "Interview 
notes," Special Operations Technology 11:7 (October 4, 2013). 
20 U.S.  Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-26: Counterterrorism (Washington, D.C.: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, November 13, 2009): xv. 
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incorporate their SOF into the Ministry of Interior or Justice.  For example, the 
current commander of USSOCOM, Admiral William H.  McRaven, described the 
two approaches this way in testimony to the U.S.  Congress: 
 
“The direct approach is characterized by technologically-enabled small-
unit precision lethality, focused intelligence, and interagency cooperation 
integrated on a digitally-networked battlefield….the impacts of the direct 
approach are immediate, visible to public and have had tremendous 
effects on our enemies’ networks throughout the decade.  Less well known 
but decisive in importance, the indirect approach…includes empowering 
host nation forces, providing appropriate assistance to humanitarian 
agencies, and engaging key populations.  These long-term efforts increase 
partner capabilities to generate sufficient security and rule of law, address 
local needs, and advance ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal of 
violent extremism” (emphasis added).21  
 
Admiral McRaven noted the two approaches are complementary and both “build 
trust and confidence with our partners,” but “the indirect approach values local-
led efforts to buy down our partners’ security threats.”  He went on to associate 
the indirect approach with USSOCOM’s interest in a global SOF network:  
 
“The indirect approach will be critical in the fight to deter, disrupt and 
deny sanctuary to our enemies.  Therefore, we must use this approach to 
strengthen and foster a network of mutually supporting partnerships that 
are based on shared security interests.  Through this network of 
relationships, SOF can provide a hedge against strategic surprise by 
identifying and working preemptively to address problems before they 
become conflicts.”22  
 
The indirect approach involves working with foreign partners, and requires well-
established and exercised relationships with those partners.  McRaven led the 
effort to create a NATO SOF headquarters to improve SOF networking and 
interoperability among NATO allies and subsequently went on to lead 
USSOCOM’s effort to create a global SOF network.  Other well-informed SOF 
observers agree with McRaven that SOF’s indirect approach will be more 
important in the future, especially after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan recede.  
They reason that “operations outside designated war zones will necessitate 
greater collaboration with foreign forces and interagency partners.”23  Hence, the 
central importance of the indirect approach and cross-organizational 
collaboration for McRaven’s global SOF network concept.   
 
The distinction between direct and indirect SOF approaches can be applied to 
SOF in different ways, as depicted in Table 1 (SOF Approaches), potentially 
leading to confusion.  Sometimes the distinction is used to emphasize different 
                                                        
21 Admiral William H.  McRaven, Commander, United States Special Operations Command, 
"Posture Statement," Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S.  Senate, March 
6, 2012. 
22 Ibid. 
23 See, for example, Thomas, Jim and Christopher Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of 
U.S.  Special Operations Forces (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, May 2013), available at: http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2013/05/beyond-
the-ramparts-the-future-of-u-s-special-operations-forces/. 
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SOF skill sets and which SOF units tend to specialize in skills more closely 
associated with the direct or indirect approach.  Sometimes the distinction is 
used to highlight how different SOF missions are more closely associated with 
one or the other approach, and whether those missions are more often conducted 
in intense partnership with other U.S. Government agencies or foreign partners.  
Finally, the differences between the direct and indirect approach are also used to 
explain different SOF objectives, how they support national goals, and their 
respective strategic advantages and disadvantages.   
 
Adding to the disarray is the fact that there are exceptions to every generalization 
that can be made about the direct/indirect approaches.  Even if some missions 
are more commonly conducted directly or indirectly, SOF can execute all 
assigned missions themselves or through other forces.  Similarly, any SOF 
missions may require intense interagency or international collaboration.  Thus, 
even if it is generally true that the SOF direct approach to counterterrorism over 
the past decade has been interagency intensive compared to the indirect 
approach that has required more collaboration with foreign forces, the indirect 
approach in the future will need to be both intensely interagency and 
international in order to be successful.   
 
Table 1: SOF Approaches  
 SOF Approaches 
Direct Indirect 
Means 
SOF Skills 
 
Superlative small unit 
close quarter combat 
skills 
Political, cultural, and 
linguistic skills 
Forces 
 
Air Commandos 
Special Mission Units 
Navy SEALS 
Rangers 
Special Forces 
Civil Affairs 
Psychological Operations 
Ways 
Missions Counterterrorism  
Counter proliferation  
Direct Action  
Strategic 
Reconnaissance  
Information 
Operations 
Unconventional Warfare 
Psychological Operations 
Foreign Internal Defense 
Civil Affairs 
 
Partnerships Interagency International 
Ends 
Supporting 
force 
Assist partners 
physically destroy the 
adversary 
Advise partners on 
reducing sources of 
support until adversary 
collapses 
Lead force Physically destroy the 
adversary 
Reduce sources of 
support until adversary 
collapses  
 
Because distinguishing between SOF direct and indirect approaches can be 
confusing or even misleading many in the special operations community do not 
find the terms helpful and have stopped using them.  Yet, the distinction holds 
true in the main and is useful for describing and explaining SOF skills, forces and 
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missions.  The distinction is also important for prescriptive purposes.  If SOF’s 
indirect approach will be more important in the future, then USSOCOM needs to 
develop the same cross-organizational collaboration skills for the indirect SOF 
approach that it has used to such good effect in its direct approach to 
counterterrorism.24 
 
SOF Interagency Collaboration and the Indirect Approach 
For several reasons it will be harder for USSOCOM to act on collaboration 
imperatives while pursing SOF’s indirect approach.  As already noted, SOF 
special mission units have more latitude to act independently against terrorists in 
war zones than they do in peacetime environments, so the inclination of other 
departments and agencies to follow SOF’s lead will diminish.  In addition, 
USSOCOM forces that are more comfortable with the indirect approach have less 
prestige and fewer resources to share with other departments and agencies to 
facilitate collaboration.  The perceived need for interagency collaboration also 
may fall off.  McChrystal understood he could not succeed without interagency 
assistance, but many confuse SOF’s indirect approach with simply training 
foreign forces; something they believe the military—and even forces other than 
SOF—can handle alone for the most part.  However, SOF’s indirect approach is 
not equivalent to just providing military training.  SOF work with foreign forces 
to achieve security objectives shared by foreign governments and ours in ways 
that are consistent with U.S. interests and values, something that requires intense 
interagency collaboration, particularly with the Department of State.25  
 
Some may argue it will be impossible for USSOCOM to develop a refined 
interagency capacity to employ SOF indirectly against irregular threats through 
partnerships with other governments and their security forces.  They will note the 
Department of State has the lead for security assistance, and that within 
embassies, the senior military representative on country teams is typically the 
defense attaché or security assistance officer, neither of whom typically come 
from SOF.  Others may argue that special mission units are already taking the 
indirect approach to irregular threats in non-war zones and there is no need to 
see a similar capacity employed by Special Forces and others from the U.S. Army 
Special Operations Command.  Finally, some may even argue that the Special 
Forces and U.S. Army Special Operations Command are not up to the task; that 
their culture is too insular and not innovative enough to emulate the interagency 
successes of special mission units. 
 
None of these objections are compelling.  It is true that USSOCOM’s plans for a 
global SOF network have raised concerns in Congress and the Department of 
State.26  McChrystal’s initiatives also raised concerns.  He “lacked a clear mandate 
to either build a network or get other organizations to join it,” and “critics in 
different parts of the U.S.  Government felt we were straying outside our 
traditional role.”  Yet he “saw no other organization weaving the kind of web that 
was needed” and he took responsibility for building a team that would embrace 
                                                        
24 The author and others have made this argument in testimony to Congress.   
25 Christopher Jon Lamb, “The Future of U.S.  Special Operations Forces,” Testimony before the 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, U.S.  House 
of Representatives, July 11, 2012.   
26 Paul McLeary, “Lawmakers Skeptical of Global Spec Ops Plan,” Army Times, August 10, 2013. 
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all activities necessary to generate desire outcomes.27  Concerns in Congress and 
other national security organizations must be allayed, but in principle they are 
not insurmountable obstacles.  For example, it is true that State has the lead for 
security assistance but there is nothing to prevent ambassadors from allowing 
SOF personnel to lead an interagency sub-group of the country team to deal with 
specific security threats in foreign countries.  Ambassadors are also the senior 
U.S. officials in countries where special mission units operate using the direct 
approach, and that has not proven to be an impossible impediment.   
 
Similarly, while it is true that defense attachés and security assistance officers 
traditionally are the senior military representatives on country teams, there is 
nothing to prevent the Department of Defense from recommending and sending 
SOF personnel to lead an interagency group charged with the mission of leading 
the overall U.S. support effort against an irregular threat in another country.  
While it may be true that special mission units are already operating against 
irregular threats in non-war zones, that does not mean they are the best choice to 
do so.  Some even suggest special mission units pay lip service to the indirect 
approach to gain access in order to directly engage their terrorist targets.  In any 
case, the argument made here is that the U.S.  Army Special Operations 
Command would be a better choice for USSOCOM.  It owns the SOF units best 
suited to the indirect approach, and should be the force providers for the Theater 
Special Operations Commands that oversee SOF operations for Geographic 
Commands.  It remains to be determined whether the U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command and its Special Forces are inclined to take the lead in this 
area.  If they are not, it should be a matter of some concern to USSOCOM since 
the indirect approach is an historic focus of Army Special Forces. 
 
The Department of Defense and USSOCOM have detailed plans for implementing 
the global SOF network.28  However, to emulate the interagency successes of the 
special mission units, they need to act upon the four prerequisites identified 
above.  That means forging interagency relationships in Washington, D.C. to 
support greater collaboration in U.S. embassies between SOF and other 
departments and agencies, which McRaven is attempting to do through a 
Washington office dedicated to interagency collaboration.29  It means having the 
U.S. Army Special Operations Command, which owns the SOF units best suited 
to the indirect approach, make interagency collaboration the critical priority for 
the command.  It means making more resources available to that Command and 
in ways that would permit them to share resources with the Department of State 
and other U.S. national security organizations.  It means that USSOCOM, and 
more specifically the U.S.  Army Special Operations Command, will have to 
change their own organizational cultures to better support SOF’s indirect 
approach and collaboration with other organizations like the Department of 
State.  Finally, the nation, and perhaps SOCOM, would have to accept the risks 
associated with granting more latitude to embassy country teams and interagency 
groups operating out of them to achieve national objectives through indirect 
                                                        
27 Ibid. 
28 Szayna, Thomas S.  and William Welser, Developing and Assessing Options for the Global SOF 
Network (Santa Monica: RAND, 2013).   
29 Ibid; USSOCOM believes this office would be better able to work interagency collaboration than 
the extensive and somewhat unwieldy set of liaison officers parked in innumerable offices by special 
mission units. 
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means.  All of these requirements would be difficult to pursue without the 
perceived collective urgency that was widely embraced after the terror attacks on 
September 11, 2001.   
 
Conclusion 
The lessons from SOF and JIATF experience are much more easily identified 
than implemented.  Many leaders, even those who have witnessed the efficacy of 
well-managed cross-organizational collaboration and understand its importance, 
would find it difficult to act upon the observations made here.  Making 
collaboration the priority and changing one’s own organization to facilitate 
collaboration is painful.  It is far easier, and often safer, to promote the 
importance of collaboration without doing anything to irritate one’s superiors or 
subordinates.  Embracing an “end-to-end” mission approach that makes an 
organization and its leaders responsible for collective outcomes they cannot fully 
or easily control also is difficult and dangerous; as is delegating authority to lower 
levels where embarrassing mistakes may be made.   
 
Yet these prerequisites for success are as necessary as they are difficult.  
Interagency success for SOF’s indirect approach against capable adversaries is 
inconceivable without intense interagency collaboration, however difficult it may 
prove to be.  To his great credit, General McChrystal realized this and had the 
leadership capacity to change his organization, its structure, processes and 
culture accordingly.  It will be even more difficult for USSOCOM to achieve a 
similar success in its indirect approach to SOF missions through a global SOF 
network and interagency partnerships managed out of U.S. embassies overseas.  
But as is often observed, the first step in solving any problem is recognizing the 
nature of the problem and what is required to solve it.  The rest is all disciplined, 
aggressive, and intelligent implementation, something USSOCOM, the U.S. Army 
Special Operations Command and Special Forces are capable of doing just as well 
as special mission units. 
  
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 7, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss2/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.2.2
20 
 
 
 
 
 
Lamb: Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
